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Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and Proposed Solutions
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 established a
national goal of environmental preservation and improvement2 that
Congress and the states have sought to achieve by enacting various
legislation. 3 While enforcement of many of the statutes has been
entrusted exclusively to government agencies, 4 recent years have
witnessed an increasing realization that effective environmental improvement is possible only if private citizens are allowed and encouraged to participate in the enforcement process. 6 The recent liberalization of standing requirements for civil suits in general0 has
facilitated citizen enforcement of environmental protection laws.
Moreover, many recent environmental protection acts contain specific provisions authorizing citizen enforcement through private litigation. 7 Parties whose interests are threatened by environmental
suits, however, have jeopardized the continued development and future effectiveness of citizen enforcement of environmental protection
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
2. "The Congress ••. declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned
private and public organizations, to use all practicable means and measures . • • in
a manner calculated to foster and promote general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony...•" National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1970).
3. See, e.g., Wild Life Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1970); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (Supp. III, 1973); Environmental Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1531-36 (1970), as amended, Environmental Education Amendments of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531, 1532, 1536 (Supp. 1975); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74 (1970).
4. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (Supp.
III, 1973); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e) (Supp. III, 1973);
Oil Pollution Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1007 (Supp. 1975),
5. See J. SAX, DEFENDING TIIE ENVIRONMENT 63 (1970).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 699 (1973).
7. Congress expressly provided for citizen enforcement of environmental regulations in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970), and the Water Pollution
Control Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65 (Supp. III, 1973). At least
seven states now have environmental protection acts that contemplate both private
and public enforcement of their provisions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a14 to -20 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE§§ 136-1-1 to -6 (Bums 1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § 7A (Supp. 1974); MICH.
COMP. LAws 691.120-.1207 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.Ol-.13 (Supp. 1975);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-lOA-1 to -15 (Supp. 1974). Many of these statutes
were drafted to avoid litigation over the standing of any legal entity to bring suit.
See, e.g., Michigan Environmental Protection Act § 2(1), M1cH. COMP, LAWS §
691.1202 (1970).
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laws by devising a new litigation strategy-the assertion of a multimillion dollar counteraction (either counterclaim or countersuit)
against the environmental plaintiff. Designed both to harass plaintiffs into compromising or withdrawing their suits and to discourage
future suits by either the present plaintiff or other prospective plaintiffs, this strategy has had measurable effects.
This Note first outlines the basic characteristics of the counteraction strategy and considers the implications of its future proliferation
and then analyzes proposals to eliminate or ameliorate the impact
of the strategy in terms of their effectiveness and practicability. 8

I.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTERACTION STRATEGY

A counteraction may take the form of either a counterclaim or
a countersuit and may be initiated either by an original defendant
in the environmental protection suit or by a party whose interest
would be indirectly affected by the outcome of that suit. Both
forms, as employed in the environmental context, share several general characteristics. First, counteraction liability is, with few exceptions, based on one or more of five common-law torts: 9 defamation, 10 malicious prosecution,11 abuse of process,12 interference with
contractual relations, and interference with prospective advantage. 18
8. The information upon which this Note is based was gathered by sending letters
inquiring about familiarity with the counteraction technique to about 150 national
and local environmental organizations known to have been involved in litigation and
to about 50 private environmental plaintiffs or plaintiffs' attorneys. About 90 per
cent of those inquiries were answered. A few responses indicated no awareness of
the tactic, many showed a general awareness of the tactic but no direct experience,
some indicated an awareness of specific instances without personal experience, and
others indicated some direct experience as objects of the tactic. Detailed discussions
followed with those environmental groups and attorneys who had had direct experience with the tactic. Over-all, these groups and attorneys were extremely willing
to provide information and displayed concern regarding the use of the tactic.
9. Other theories are also relied upon, depending upon the facts of the particular
case. For example, in Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw
County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972), and Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim
County, Mich., June 23, 1973 ), the counteractions alleged civil conspiracy among the
individuals who brought the original action. Claims for such obscure actions as "officious intermeddling" have also been asserted.
10. See, e.g., Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County,
N.Y., filed June 11, 1971); Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972); Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim
County, Mich., June 23, 1973).
1 I. See, e.g., Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County,
N.Y., filed June 11, 1971); Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 90-3
(Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., Dec. 30, 1972).
12. Cf. A.I. Lane Constr. Corp. v. Hawkes, Civ. No. 73-3586-C (D. Mass. filed
June 29, 1973, dismissed March 25, 1975, refiled April 24, 1975) (suit in response
to petition of state agency on the validity of the issuance of a permit).
13. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Cf.
McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Jan.
5, 1972) (suit in response to speech at public hearing).
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Generally, the theory of counteraction liability is determined by the
technique chosen by the environmental group to promote environmental quality. Groups that rely upon publication to create awareness of environmental dangers are likely to face a defamation
counteraction; those that rely primarily on the judicial forum more
often face a counteraction alleging abuse of process or malicious
prosecution. Second, the counteraction invariably includes a request
for damages in the prayer for relief.14 Typically, an astronomical
sum is requested; claims often range between $40 and $80 million. 1G
Third, the litigant asserting the counteraction is usually a private
party with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the suit: governmental units have rarely utilized the tactic. 16 Fourth, the targets of
the counteraction are almost exclusively local and ad hoc environmental groups and individuals. Originally, counteractions were also
brought to harass established national environmental organizations, 17
but the willingness of these organizations to litigate the counteractions seems to have halted the practice.18
The final and perhaps most interesting characteristic of these
counteractions is that they are rarely litigated. 10 Because most are
14. In addition to damages, declaratory and injunctive relief are often sought.
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (requesting injunctions against future interference with contractual relations).
15. Claims for both punitive and compensatory damages in excess of $10 million
are quite common. See, e.g., McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. Ct.
Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1973) (requesting $80 million); Sierra Club v.
Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (requesting $20 million); Apfel v. Cook,
No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973) (requesting $12.5 million).
16. However, counteractions may be asserted in response to original suits against
the government. See Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
County, N.Y., filed June 11, 1971). There is some evidence of counteraction threats
by government officials, although none of these threats has yet materialized into a
counteraction. See Letter from Environmental Defense Fund, East Setauket, N.Y.,
Sep. 5, 1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter EDF Letter].
17. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), was one of the first
(and least successful) documented attempts to use the counteraction tactic.
18. James Moorman, attorney for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, stated in
a telephone conversation on Nov. 31, 1974, that Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp.
934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), represented the last serious attempt to use counteraction harassment against the Sierra Club, and that counteractions are no longer a problem for
that organization. The National Audubon Society has not been the object of threatened suits designed to inhibit its litigation but its local branches have faced such actions. Letter from Louis R. Proyect, attorney, Oct. 1, 1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review. The Environmental Defense Fund has received frequent threats
of counteractions and countersuits but none has yet materialized. EDF Letter, supra
note 16.
19. Only three litigated cases have been discovered. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.
Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), and McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super.
Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1972), were dismissed after argument on summary judgment. Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 22,
1973), was also dismissed in summary judgment but was subsequently refiled. The
overwhelming majority of counteractions never make it past the pleading stage. For
example, Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County, N.Y.,
filed June 11, 1971), has remained inactive with no motion for summary judgment
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brought for harassment or bargaining purposes, they are withdrawn
during the litigation of the original environmental claim or concurrently with the withdrawal or compromise of the environmental
claim. In those known counteractions that have been litigated to
a decision, environmental litigants have uniformly prevailed.
The counteraction strategy seeks to produce two results. The
immediate objective is to cause the environmentalist to withdraw or
compromise his suit. The litigant asserting the counteraction typically makes an offer to the environmental plaintiff for reciprocal dismissal of pending actions. 20 While this offer is rarely accepted, the
mere existence of the counteraction and the consequent threat of incurring enormous liability puts pressure upon the environmental
plaintiff to settle his claim rather than litigate it. 21 The second goal
of counteractions is to discourage future suits. 22 A multi-million dollar counteraction in one suit portends the possibility of such counteractions in future suits23 and thus may inhibit environmentalists from
litigating meritorious claims. 24 If the financial burden of bringing
an environmental suit necessarily includes the cost of defending a
counteraction, environmentalists may determine that use of the litigation technique is infeasible in most instances.
The counteraction strategy is most successful against ad hoc
groups and small environmental organizations. Inexperienced in litigation25 and often formed merely to challenge a single environor trial since 1971. Letter from David B. Sive, attorney, Sep. 16, 1974, on file with
the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Sive Letter].
20. See, e.g., Letter from David G. Knibb, attorney, Nov. 25, 1974, on file with
the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Knibb Letter], discussing Alpine Lakes Protection Soc. v. Harden, No. 8885 (W.D. Wash., filed 1971); Complaint at 13, Three
Lakes Assn. v. Whiting, No. 74-025-272 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., Jan. 1975)
[hereinafter Three Lakes Assn. Complaint].
21. However, some attorneys whose clients have faced counteractions refuse to
take them seriously. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph W. Wilcox, attorney, Oct. 25,
1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Wilcox Letter]. Other attorneys have observed that a frivolous counterclaim "tends to solidify plaintiffs' resolve rather than scare them," Letter from George Snyder, attorney, Oct. 29, 1974,
on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Snyder Letter], although environmentalists who hear of such counteractions by public rumor are deeply concerned.
See id.
22. One possible effect of a counteraction is the depletion of the financial resources of the environmentalist against whom it is asserted, which thus prevents him
from bringing future actions. See Snyder Letter, supra note 21.
23. The environmentalists seem to be as well acquainted with the existence and
operation of this tactic as their attorneys. See Letter from J. Richard Aramburu,
attorney, Oct. 25, 1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
24. See Sive Letter, supra note 19 ("The threat of countersuit is constantly with
attorneys bringing such suit and the organizations they represent. Regardless of with
how much assurance . . • attorneys can advise potential plaintiffs that counterclaims
will probably be dismissed, there is a real problem"); Sax & DiMento, Environmental
Citizen Suits: Three Years Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 Eco. LQ. 1, 22 (1974).
25. Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 7.
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mental danger, such groups rarely possess the resources to carry on
a prolonged legal battle. 26 Group members in many instances evidence a great fear of incurring extensive liability in the litigation of
environmental claims: They seek to ensure a healthy environment
but balk at the possibility of incurring multi-million dollar liability
in the process.
The widespread use and success of the counteraction tactic could
have far-reaching consequences. Many state environmental protection acts grant private citizens standing to litigate27 and contain provisions to minimize the cost of bringing suit under them. 28 The viability of these acts depends in large measure upon citizen willingness
to engage in private environmental litigation. 2° Citizen suits prod
administrative agencies into dealing with environmental problems80
and violators into complying with statutes. 81 By discouraging citizen
litigation through the threat of liability and litigation expense, the
counteraction tactic undermines a principal means of enforcing state
environmental protection acts. 82 As a result, the enforcement of environmental regulations may be left exclusively to government agencies, rendering the environment once again a ward of administrative
discretion. 88
The implications of the counteraction tactic extend beyond its
chilling effect upon environmental protection. Practically, the tactic
26. Not only will the environmentalist group's resources affect the initial decision
to go to trial, see id. at 51, but they will determine the over-all impact of a counteraction on the group. See Wilcox Letter, supra note 21. Those groups that depend
upon ad hoc fund raising are particularly susceptible to compromise when faced with
counteractions. See Letter from Mrs. Lindsay C. Smith, Clean Water Chairman of
the Alabama Conservancy, Jan. 1, 1975, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
Furthermore, the expenses incurred in defending counteractions may reduce the funds
available for the groups' ongoing activities. See Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra
note 20, at 29-30.
21. See statutes cited in note 7 supra. See generally 2 ENV. L. REV. 313 (1972).
28. For example, section 2(a) of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1975), sets $500 as maximum security
that a plaintiff may be required to post. It was recognized that the liberal standing
provisions of the Act would be futile if another section of the Act exposed environmentalist plaintiffs to substantial costs in bringing suit. Sax & Conner, Michigan's
Environmental Protection Act: A Progress Report, 10 MICH. L. REV, 1003, 1077
(1972).
29. See J. SAX, supra note 5, at 113; Hadden, The Socio-Economic Aspects of
Private Environmental Litigation, 43 J. URBAN L. 607, 612 (1972); Sax & DiMento,
supra note 24, at 2.
30. See Hadden, supra note 29, at 613 ("Regulatory agencies are more often victims than villains, and well-placed law suits naming them as defendants can liberate
them from unwarranted political pressure"); Sax & Conner, supra note 28, at 1080.
See also Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 12.
31. J. SAX, supra note 5, at 231.
32. Sax & Conner, supra note 28, at 1004-05.
33. The breakdown in effective environmental regulation caused by administrative
discretion may have prompted legislatures to provide for private enforcement. See
Sax & Conner, supra note 28, at 1005.
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wastes the judicial resources necessary to supervise the filing of sham
pleadings, to set up pre-trial conferences and discovery, and to conduct a formal trial. With the workload of courts increasing at almost
astronomical rates, 34 the expenditure of judicial resources for other
than settling genuine disputes is especially odious. Moreover, the
tactic challenges the ability of private citizens to enforce their rights
in the judicial setting and thus undercuts what is perhaps the most
expeditious way for an ordinary citizen to reaffirm his belief in our
governmental system:
The opportunity for anyone to obtain at least a hearing and honest
consideration of matters that he feels important must not be underestimated. The availability of the judicial forum means that access
to government is a reality for the ordinary citizen-that he can be
heard, and that, in a setting of equality, he can require bureaucrats
and even the biggest industries to respond to his questions and justify
themselves before a disinterested auditor . . . .35

In the extreme, the counteraction technique threatens to destroy
whatever equality exists in the judicial setting. The openness of the
courts becomes a myth if an affluent party, through the assertion of
a multimillion dollar counterclaim or countersuit, can effectively
force an environmentalist out of court.
There is one important caveat to this extensive indictment of
counterclaims and countersuits in environmental protection actions.
While the motives of environmentalists might generally be laudable,
there is always a possibility that they will either intentionally or unconsciously assert a frivolous environmental claim. 36 Consequently,
a counteraction may have merit. Any proposed solution to the
counteraction problem must recognize and preserve the rights of
those asserting meritorious counteractions.
II.

COUNTERACTION THEORIES AND DEFENSES

This section describes the various counteraction theories of liability. Because few counteraction cases are litigated to a decision and
because most of those decided are not reported, 37 the factual circumstances surrounding the counteraction tactic have largely gone un34. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260 n.14 (1973) (Powell, J.,
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring).
35. J. SAX, supra note 5, at 112 (emphasis original).
36. For instance, a frivolous environmental suit may arise when a large contractor on a multimillion dollar construction project faces a stringent completion
deadline that he must meet to avoid substantial monetary penalties. An environmental group, knowing of no real harm created by the project, nevertheless may bring
suit to enjoin construction and thereby obtain a monetary settlement from the pressured contractor that will enrich its own treasury. In such circumstances, there is
no justification for shielding the environmentalist from the normal penalties imposed
for abuse of the legal system.
37. See note 19 supra.
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noticed. Actual counteraction cases that illustrate the problems
faced by environmental plaintiffs are therefore included to help environmentalists prepare future strategies. Consideration is also given
to those defenses generally available to environmentalists. While
the availability and probability of success of these defenses make a
finding of liability unlikely, the significance of the defenses must be
discounted. Affirmative defenses are successful only after substantial trial litigation. When asserted against poorly funded environmentalists with little litigation experience, counteractions can harass
and instill a fear of liability before this stage is reached. To minimize this harassment, environmentalists need some method of dismissing counteractions in the pre-trial stages of the litigation of the
environmental claim. In attempting to devise a defense that can
serve this purpose, environmental plaintiffs recently have relied upon
the first amendment freedom to petition the government. The legal
theory that underlies this defense and its potential for success are
discussed in detail.
A.

Defamation

The tort of defamation38 is the basis for most harassing counteractions presumably because many environmentalists attempt to maximize publicity about activities allegedly damaging the environment.
Significantly, even though such publicity may appreciably precede
commencement of an environmental suit, it is in most instances only
after the environmentalist has brought suit that a counteraction is asserted alleging that the prior publicity was defamatory. For example, in Adams v. Town of Rockland,39 Adams, contending that
a proposed subdivision would pollute the Beaverskill River and a
nearby lake, brought suit against a local zoning board and two land
developers. Over one year prior to initiating the action, Adams had
written a letter to the New York Times complaining that the defendant developers had misrepresented the environmental impact of the
subdivision in a series of advertisements. 40 In a letter to a local
newspaper, Adams had also charged that the subdivision would pol38. Although the law of defamation may vary, causes of action for libel are
widely recognized throughout the states. See Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Credit
Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959). One court has defined libel as follows:
"Libel is generally understood to be that which is written or printed, and published,
calculated to injure the reputation of another by bringing him into ridicule, hatred
or contempt; and lessening the esteem of the victim and injuring him in his trade
or business are other elements of the tort." Laurence Univ. v. State, 68 Misc. 2d
408, 413, 326 N.Y.S.2d 617, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1971), revd. OllJ other grounds, 41 App.
Div. 2d 463, 344 N.Y.S.2d 183 ( 1973 ). Damage to reputation is the essence of libel.
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1970).
39. No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County, N.Y., filed June 11, 1971 ).
40. See Answer at 5, Adams v. Town. of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
County, N.Y., filed June 11, 1971) [hereinafter Adams Answer].
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lute both the river and the lake. 41 It was only after Adams commenced his injunction action that the developers asserted their defamation claim, 42 which alleged that his letters had injured them to
the extent of $1 million. 43
While many generally recognized defenses are available to an
environmentalist faced with a defamation counteraction, 44 truth and
the privilege of fair comment on issues of public concern have been
the defenses most frequently invoked.
In most jurisdictions, truth is an absolute defense to charges of
libel and slander. 45 In other jurisdictions, truth is a defense as long
as publication is made for good motives or for justifiable ends. 46 Environmentalists capable of proving the truth of their publications,
therefore, have little reason to compromise their claims because of
defamation counteractions. In many instances, however, it is difficult to prove the accuracy of the publicized facts. 47 Where the allegedly defamatory matter primarily describes visible physical dam41. See Adams Answer, supra note 40, at 5-6.
42. A claim for malicious prosecution was also included in this counterclaim.
See Adams Answer, supra note 40, at 6.
43. Another common publicity effort by an environmental plaintiff formed the
basis for the countersuit in Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct.
Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972). In that case, the Little Traverse
Bay Group had sent newsletters to residents throughout the state that detailed
the proposed development of the Traverse Bay region and the potential environmental problems, and requested contributions to aid in a legal action to halt the
Cedar Cove construction project. Also included in the countersuit complaint was an
allegation that the defendant environmentalists had falsely represented to state officials that the project would destroy certain wetlands.
44. These defenses include truth, consent, absolute privilege, qualified privilege,
and fair comment or constitutionally privileged criticism. Jolley v. Valley Publishing
Co., 63 Wash. 2d 537, 541, 338 P.2d 139, 141 (1964).
45. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967). If, upon a lawful
occasion for making a publication, an individual has published the truth and no more,
then there is no sound principle that can make him liable, even if he was actuated
by malice: if there is a legal right to make the publication and the matter is true,
the end is justifiable. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). The raising
of the defense of truth, however, may turn into a hazardous adventure if its proponent is unsuccessful. See 56 MICH. L. REv. 659 (1958). Some courts have held
that the unsuccessful raising of the defense of truth has further published the defamatory matter to the hearing of the jury and have thus allowed the unsuccessful plea
to be considered in aggravation of damages. See Marley v. Providence Journal Co.,
86 R.I. 229, 134 A.2d 180 (1957).
46. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 797-98 (4th ed.
1971). This limitation on the truth defense does, however, raise first amendment
problems. See Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
See generally Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth
as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. R.Ev. 789 (1964).
47. The environmentalist litigant must show that the truth is as broad as the allegedly defamatory statement. Empire Printing Co. v. Roden, 247 F.2d 8, 15 (9th
Cir. 1957). However, immaterial variances and defects in proof on minor matters
will be disregarded if the substance of the matter is justified. Stoneking v. Briggs,
254 Cat. App. 2d 563, 573, 62 Cal. Rptr. 249,256 (1967).
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age to the environment,48 the defense can often be established.
When, as is often the case, the publication largely speculates about
prospective harm, however, greater difficulty arises. Establishing a
factual basis for the statement may require expert testimony, which
may in turn require monetary resources not available to environmentalists. 49 The truth justification, therefore, may be of limited
utility.
The overlapping common-law and constitutional privileges of fair
comment on issues of public concern, which do not require a demonstration of truth, 50 will be appealing to environmentalists when the
truth of the publication is difficult to prove. The common law recognizes a broad privilege for publication of comments on matters of
public concern. 51 The initial constitutionalization of this privilege
as a civil liability defense in New York Times v. Sullivan 62 covered
only comments about public officials acting in their official capacity.
While the scope of this constitutional privilege was later enlarged
to cover comments on general matters of public concern, 63 the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, lnc. 64 restricted its reach essentially to statements concerning "public officials" or "public figures." 55 The constitutional privilege consequently is of little aid to the environmentalist unless the allegedly
defamatory statement concerned a public official or public figure. 68
48. See, e.g., Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw
County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972), discussed in note 43 supra.
49. The problem of costs of expert witnesses bas been solved in some cases by
the recognition of a "lay expert," i.e., a local citizen with special knowledge of the
effects of activities upon an area, based on long-time familiarity with that area,
While the effectiveness of such "lay experts" is unclear, it may help an environmentalist when combined with expert testimony. Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at
34-35.
50. Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alas. 1964).
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 118, at 822.
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Supreme Court
extended the Sullivan rule to public figures. The plurality opinion in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1970), held that it is the issue discussed, rather
than the individual who is allegedly defamed, that determines the availability of the
privilege.
54. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
55. The Court did conclude, however, that while states "may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual," they cannot impose liability without fault. 418 U.S. at 347 (footnote deleted). Moreover, the Court concluded that recovery in defamation cases
must be limited to actual damages and cannot include presumed and punitive damages. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
56. A business may be a public figure under Gertz, but the standard by which
this is to be determined is unclear. See Note, Corporate Defamation and Product
Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy lo Personal Defamation, 15 CoLUM. L. RE.v.
963, 990-91 (1975). See also Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. RE.v, 429,
470-71 (1971). Furthermore, environmentalists whose allegedly defamatory remarks
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Whether the allegedly defamatory matter qualifies as a "fair
comment'' on a matter of "public concern" and is thus protected by
the common-law privilege is a factual determination presumably dependent upon factors such as the social values at stake, the amount
of private intrusion, and the public importance of the comment. 57
Therefore, it is difficult to delineate with· certainty the particularized
circumstances under which environmentalists could invoke the privilege. Local zoning decisions, grants of construction permits, and environmentally harmful activities in general are probably of sufficient
public concern to warrant protection by this qualified privilege. 58
One significant limitation on the privilege· in many jurisdictions, however, is that only expressions of "comment" or opinion and not misstatements of fact are protected. 59 Although this distinction has
been vigorously criticized, 60 its existence counsels environmentalists
to couch their public allegations in terms of opinion rather than fact.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Environmentalists at times have been confronted with counteractions alleging malicious prosecution or, as the tort is sometimes
called, wrongful civil proceedings. 61 Originally a remedy for unjustifiable criminal proceedings, the malicious prosecution tort in
most but not all jurisdictions has been extended to cover the wrongful initiation of civil suits. 62 A counteraction based on this tort that
requests millions of dollars in damages may initially scare inexperienced environmentalists. In light of the elements that must be
proved in an action for malicious prosecution, however, an environmental claim brought in good faith, even though legally frivolous,
should not give rise to liability.
A malicious prosecution counteraction was asserted, for example,
in Property Development Group v. lrish. 63 In early 1972, Irish and
three other persons formed the Little Traverse Bay Group (LTG),
an organization designed to protect the natural areas of northern
Michigan from damaging overdevelopment. Soon thereafter a series
of confrontations occurred between LTG and the Property Developinvolved not only dispargement of a business but criticism of the public figure entrusted with the regulation of that business may be able to claim the privilege. Cf.
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
57. See La Bruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
58. See Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d
440 (1955); W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 118, at 822-23.
59. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 118, at 819-20.
60. See Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1203 (1962); 62 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1207
(1949).
61. See W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 120, at 850.
62. See id. § 120, at 851-52.
63. No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972).
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ment Group (PDG), an organization seeking to construct a large
condominium project along the northern Lake Michigan shoreline.
LTG devised a multi-faceted program to arrest the project and sent
two newsletters to citizens of several counties explaining the possible
environmental impacts of the project and inviting them to make financial contributions to the group's efforts. 64 In addition, LTG petitioned a state regulatory agency to deny construction permits for the
project and, finally, brought suit to enjoin further development of
the project until several alternative plans were considered. 66 Immediately before trial of this suit, PDG filed a countersuit against
Irish for $5,750,000 in which it alleged, inter alia, malicious prosecution, defamation, and interference with prospective economic advantage.
Although the counteraction in Irish was never tried, it is extremely doubtful that the malicious prosecution allegation would
have succeeded. There are three principal elements to the malicious prosecution cause of action. First, counteraction plaintiffs
ordinarily must prove the termination of the environmental suit in
their favor. 66 This requirement typically makes premature both a
counterclaim for malicious prosecution in the original civil action,
and a countersuit, as in Irish, prior to termination of the environmental claim. 67 Second, plaintiffs must prove that the environmental proceeding was initiated without probable cause. 68 Environmentalists who have sought advice of counsel in bringing their action
should have no difficulty disproving this element: If the counsel's
advice to bring suit was based upon full disclosure of the relevant
facts by the environmentalists, probable cause for the original action
will exist. 69 Moreover, it is generally agreed that termination of the
original claim in favor of the defendant is no evidence that probable
cause was lacking. 70 Third, plaintiffs must prove "malice" in bring64. These two circulars formed the basis for the libel claim asserted in the co1,1ntersuit. See Complaint at 6-12, Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No; 7265 (Cir. Ct.
Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972) [hereinafter Property Dev. Group
Complaint].
65. In this case, Irish v. Property Dev. Group, No. 234-3 (Cir. Ct. Emmet
County, Mich., March 5, 1973), both temporary and permanent injunctive relief was
sought. The court refused to grant the permanent injunction although jurisdiction
to supervise the project was.retained. See Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 11.
66. See, e.g., LaSalle Natl. Bank v. 222 East Chestnut St. Corp., 267 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1959). 1t is a favorable not a final
termination that is required; termination by compromise or settlement is not considered a favorable termination. Paskle v. Williams, 6 P.2d 505, 214 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1931).
67. W. PRossER, supra note 46, § 120, at 853 n.32.
68. Id. at 854.
69. See Alexander v. Alexander, 229 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1956); W. PROSSER,
supra note 46, § 121, at 854.
70. See Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932).
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ing the environmental action. 71 Loosely defined in this context,
"malice" may consist of a primary motive of ill will, a lack of belief
in any possible success of the action, or a purpose in bringing the
suit other than the adjudication of the claim. 72 Presumably, any environmental action brought in good faith will fail to satisfy the malice
requirement.
C.

Abuse of Process

The essence of the abuse of process tort is that the judicial process in an earlier action, while perhaps initiated with probable cause,
was used by the former plaintiff for a collateral advantage that is
not a proper goal of a judicial proceeding. 73 Abuse of process might
lie, for example, if a business brought an environmental suit with
the ulterior purpose of forcing a competitor to stop doing business
in a certain area or with the purpose of extorting the payment of
a debt.
For purposes of counteraction harassment, abuse of process is
superior to malicious prosecution since the plaintiff need show
neither that the process in the environmental action was obtained
without probable cause, 74 nor that the prior action was terminated
in his favor. 75 Abuse of process counteractions, either counterclaims
or countersuits, can thus be brought while the environmental suit is
still pending. 76 Yet, environmentalists should have no more to fear
from abuse of process counteractions than from malicious prosecution counteractions. An action brought in good faith for the purpose
of alleviating an allegedly illegal environmental hazard should not
give rise to liability under either of the tort theories. 77
D.

Economic Relations Torts

Because environmental actions frequently damage the economic
expectations of both defendants and nonparties, 78 harassing counteractions are often based on business tort theories. Environmental
71. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 120, at 855.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
853 (1963); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 4 Ill. App. 3d 962, 282 N.E.2d 452 (1972);
Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 373-74, 7 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1937).
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 121, at 856.
15. Id.
76. Id.
77. Wilkerson v. Randall, 254 Miss. 546, 180 S.2d 303 (1965).
78. A third party whose economic interest will be affected by a judgment against
the defendant may intervene in the original suit and join in a counterclaim against
the environmental plaintiff. See, e.g., Alpine Lakes Protection Soc. v. Hardin, No.
8885 (W.D. Wash., filed 1971) (mining company that would have benefited from
defendant's activities intervened in suit to stop road construction brought against Forest Service), discussed in Knibb Letter, supra note 20.
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suits that constrain the conduct of a business have provoked counteractions founded on unjustifiable interference with prospective advantage;79 those that threaten to alter rights under an existing contract
have provoked charges of inducing breach of contract or, more generally, interference with contractual relations. 80
In an action for interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally interfered with a legal, enforceable contract and thereby injured the plaintiff. 81 Typically, in the environmental context a complaint will allege that the
plaintiff has been prevented from performing a contract or that his
performance has been rendered more burdensome or expensive.
There is a broad privilege, however, that protects the interfering defendant if his actions have a proper purpose or are prompted by an
impersonal or disinterested motive of a laudable character. 82 In
particular, several decisions suggest that a privilege exists for actions
undertaken to protect the public interest. 83 In light of these privileges, environmentalists rarely should incur liability based on interference with contractual relations.
The closely related tort of interference with prospective advantage also should not give rise to liability for actions by environmentalists. While a plaintiff need only prove that the defendant intentionally frustrated his reasonable expectations of profit or gain, 84 the
environmentalist again should escape liability by demonstrating that
his actions protect a legitimate interest. 85
Similar to defamation (and perhaps at times confused with it)
are the torts of injurious falsehood and product disparagement. The
essence of these torts in the environmental context is that the de79. See, e.g., McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. Ct. Sacramento
County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1972); Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Wash•
tenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972); Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim
County, Mich., June 22, 1973).
80. At least since Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853), a cause of
action based on unjustifiable intentional interference with .the contract of a third per•
son has been recognized. Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953). There are four
essential elements of this cause of action: (1) defendant's knowledge of an existing
contract; (2) inducement by defendant of a third person to breach of contract; (3)
subsequent breach by the third person; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. Northern
Ins. Co. v. Doctor, 23 Ill. App. 2d 225, 228, 161 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1959). Recovery
may be allowed not only for interference with performance of an existing contract,
but also for the -interference with a contract that would have been consummated but
for the wrongful interference. Zoby v. American Fidelity Co., 242 F.2d 76, 79 (4th
Cir. 1957).
81. W. PRossER, supra note 46, § 129.
82. Id. § 129, at 943.
83. See Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906); Radio Station KFH Co. v.
Musicians Assn. Local 297, 169 Kan. 596, 220 P.2d 199 (1950); Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v. Tarrullo, 103 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
84. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 130, at 950.
85. Id. § 130, at 953 n.94.
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fendant has disparaged the plaintiff's business or products and has
thus caused others not to deal with the plaintiff. 86 These torts are
more difficult to prove than defamation, for, in addition to proving
the statement's publication and its disparaging innuendo, the plaintiff
must prove that the statement is false and that he has suffered actual
damages. 87 Moreover, the privileges available in defamation actions, in particular the privilege of fair comment on matters of public
concern, are available as defenses. 88 Perhaps as a result of these
difficulties, counteractions have rarely alleged either of these torts.

E.

The Defense of Freedom To Petition the Government

A counteraction that states a valid claim for relief, even though
frivolous in light of available defenses, is apt to be judicially consolidated with the environmental claim and not disposed of until the environmental claim comes to trial. Because pre-trial maneuvers in
the litigation of the environmental claim are time-consuming, a
counteraction may, for many months, pressure environmentalists into
accepting a less desirable settlement. Therefore, environmentalists
need a defense to counteractions that justifies an immediate dismissal of the counteraction for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. Such a defense, based on the first amendment
right to petition the government for redress of grievances, has recently been suggested. 89
Sierra Club v. Butz,90 one of the few counteraction cases reaching the point of decision, involved a counterclaim alleging both interference with contractual relations and interference with prospective
advantage. The Sierra Club had brought suit against the Secretary
of Agriculture and Humboldt Fir, Inc., a private logging company,
to prevent further logging and road construction in a certain forest
area until the Secretary could review a request that Congress declare
the forest a wilderness area. At the time of suit, Humboldt had a
contract with the Department of Agriculture for timber sales and
hoped to benefit from the Forest Service's contemplated program to
expand sales from the area. Humboldt responded swiftly. On the
same day that the Sierra Club filed its complaint, Humboldt filed
the initial pleading of its two-count counterclaim that ultimately requested nearly $20 million in damages. The Sierra Club response
to this counterclaim has profoundly influenced subsequent counteraction litigation for two reasons: it was the first environmentalist at86. Id. § 128.
87. Id. § 128, at 919-20.
88. See Gott v. Pulsifier, 122 Mass. 235 (1876); Browning v. Van Rensselaer,
97 F. 531 (C.C. Pa. 1899).
89. See Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
90. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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tempt to confront a harassing counteraction with serious courtroom
litigation, and it suggested a constitutional framework for defending
such counteractions. The court dismissed Humboldt's counterclaim
for failure to state a claim for relief on the ground that the facts it
alleged amounted to an exercise by the Sierra Club of its right to
the petition the government. 91
Because the court's reasoning was rather facile, the arguments
supporting the constitutional defense are stated here more persuasively in order to evaluate the viability of the court's conclusion.
The court should have applied the constitutional defense in this case
only after finding that the following four requirements were satisfied: first, that the Sierra Club's actions in organizing opposition to
Humboldt, in petitioning relevant federal agencies, and in bringing
suit against Humboldt for decl!1fatory and injunctive relief amounted
to petitioning the government for redress of grievances; second, that
granting Humboldt damages on its tort counterclaim would constitute
state action; third, that the state action, if found, would infringe the
right to petition the government without adequate justification; and
fourth, that the freedom to petition the government can be employed
as a defense in a civil suit.
With regard to the first requirement, the Sierra Club court presumed that the alleged injury was caused by petitioning the relevant
federal agencies, notwithstanding Humboldt's allegation, recounted
by the court, that its injury flowed from all of the Sierra Club's activities, including its suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Because petitioning federal agencies is clearly within the constitutional
protection, the court ignored the more difficult question whether the
commencement of a civil suit constitutes petitioning the government. On this issue, the leading decision is NAACP v. Button,° 2
in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state's attempt to preclude
the NAACP from funding group legal services. The Court concluded that the NAACP activities in organizing and sponsoring litigation constituted political association protected by the first amendment:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of
resolving private differences; it is a means of achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment .by all government, federal, state and
local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It
is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves
unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn
to the courts. . . . [U]nder the conditions of modern government,
litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority
to petition for redress of grievances.
91. 349 F. Supp. at 939.
92. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

November 19751

Harassment of Environmental Plaintiffs

121

. . . For such a group, association for litigation may be the most
effective form of political association. 93

While the Button Court did not hold that litigation, when engaged
in for purposes other than resolving private differences, amounts to
petitioning the government for redress of grievances, its dicta clearly
suggest that result. Under this analysis, it is arguable that an environmental organization is petitioning the government even if it
turns only to the courts for relief rather than, as was the case in Sierra
Club, principally to administrative agencies. However, the Court
has not clarified its dicta in Button. Moreover, under Button, environmental organizations must demonstrate that their litigation is essentially political expression rather than an attempt to resolve private
differences-a demonstration that may be difficult if, for example,
the alleged environmental hazard affects only a small geographic
area and a limited number of landowners. The determination
whether litigation is a form of political expression, that is, whether
plaintiffs are acting as private attorneys-general, is an issue that
doubtless will be difficult for courts to resolve.
The Sierra Club court failed to mention the requirement of state
action. It has long been recognized, however, that, notwithstanding
the literal language of the first amendment, a state can violate first
amendment rights without enacting statutory prohibitions or taldng
affirmative action.94 State acquiescence or indirect participation in
private conduct designed to deny constitutional rights may effectively
amount to prohibited state action: "The First Amendment would
. . . be a hollow premise if it left government free to destroy or
erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed
that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly . . . ." 95
That state action within the contemplation of the fourteenth amendment may exist when state courts adjudicate civil actions between
private parties was made clear by the Supreme Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan. 96 There the Court, in reversing a libel judgment
in favor of a public official against publisher-critics of his official conduct, found state action in a state court adjudication of a civil claim
that restricted the constitutional freedoms of the defendant: "The
test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." 97
Environmentalists can analogously argue that state action occurs
when a state creates the cause of action upon which the counterac93. 371 U.S. at 429-31.
94. See District 12, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S.
217 (1967).
95. District 12, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217,
222 (1967).
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
97. 376 U.S. at 265.
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tion is based, adjudicates its merits, and ultimately awards damages
and enforces the judgment.
With regard to the third requirement, the court in Sierra Club
apparently assumed that no state interests could justify state action
restricting a genuine exercise of the freedom to petition the government: "[L]iability can be imposed for activities ostensibly consisting of petitioning the government for redress of grievances only if
the petitioning is a 'sham' and the real purpose is not to obtain governmental action, but to otherwise injure the plaintiff." 88 This absolute view of the first amendment freedom is difficult to support and,
indeed, conflicts with dicta in Button to the effect that state interests
in regulating the solicitation of legal work could support a narrow
statutory limitation on first amendment freedoms. 00 Because state
interests can justify infringement in some situations, courts must
weigh conflicting interests and forgo an absolutist position. States
have significant interests in allowing their residents to recover for
injuries suffered. 100 The extent to which these interests support restrictions on the freedom to petition, an issue that should in the future prove of considerable interest to environmentalists, was unfortunately left unclarified in Sierra Club.
The fourth requirement-that the freedom to petition the government be available as a defense to a civil action-was found satisfied by the court in Sierra Club after substantial inquiry. The starting point of the court's two-pronged analysis was the Supreme
Court's recognition in New York Times v. Sullivan that the constitutional freedoms of speech and press can be employed as affirmative
defenses to common-law tort actions for defamation of public officials. Upon finding that the right to petition the government is intimately connected with these first amendment freedoms, 101 the court
concluded that it also could be used as a defense. Sullivan involved
a limited constitutionalization of a defense historically recognized in
defamation cases at common law-the defense of fair comment on
issues of public concern. Because no common-law defense existed
analogous to the constitutional right to petition the government, Sullivan arguably is distinguishable. This distinction is specious, however, for if tort-action defendants were prohibited from raising their
right to petition as a defense, they would effectively be prohibited
from protecting that constitutional right. Thus, it seems fair to assume that where a tort suit that constitutes state action unjustifiably
infringes defendants' right to petition the government, that right can
be raised as a defense.
98. 349 F. Supp. at 939.
99. 371 U.S. at 438-43.
100. Cf., e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
101. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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In sum, environmentalists should face two principal obstacles to
employing the right to petition the government as a defense justifying dismissal of a counteraction. First, they must demonstrate that
their activities are petitions to the government rather than requests
to resolve private disputes, and second, they must show that state
interests in compensating those' tortiously injured fail to justify infringements of the right to petition the government. Environmentalists are aided by the fact that several courts have followed the lead
of Sierra Club in recognizing the defense. A California superior
court, in McKean Construction Corp. v. Kennedy, 102 virtually incorporated the text of the Sierra Club decision into its own opinion in
dismissing an interference with prospective advantage countersuit
against several individuals who had petitioned a local zoning agency
to deny zoning changes requested by a land developer. Because the
environmentalists in that suit actually petitioned a governmental
agency rather than requested judicial relief, the first principal obstacle was overcome without difficulty. In Apfel v. Cook, 103 a Michigan court dismissed a countersuit alleging that the environmentalists
had, inter alia, caused damage by persuading a local township to enact restrictive zoning ordinances. The court concluded that "[t]he
acts of Defendants as alleged appear in almost every instance to represent Constitutionally privileged activity."104
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances
seems destined to become increasingly important to environmental- ·
ists as a defense to civil damage actions. 105 Significantly, many state
constitutions recognize a right to petition the government, 106 and environmentalists have pressed these provisions as a basis for recognition of a civil damages defense. 107
ill.

SoLUTIONS

An acceptable solution to the counteraction problem must prevent the tactic from discouraging litigation, must take into account
the limited resources of plaintiffs and the judiciary, and must recognize the right of defendants to assert valid claims. A basic goal of
our system of justice is to accord every individual possessing a meri102. No. 221454 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1973).
103. No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973).
104. No. 926 at 2 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973).
105. Lawyers for environmentalists have been quick to seize upon this defense.
See, e.g., Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Accelerated Judgment at 2022, Property Dev. Group v. Irish, (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec.
14, 1972).
106. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 16; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 5; MAss. CoNST. part I, art. xix; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.Y. CONST.
art. I,§ 9; WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 4.
107. See, e.g., Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20.
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torious claim an opportunity to have it adjudicated. This goal is undermined by harassing counteractions that coerce the withdrawal or
compromise of legitimate environmental claims. While the rules of
procedure in most jurisdictions provide for accelerated dismissal of
nonmeritorious claims, 108 in the context of environmental counteractions these rules insufficiently reduce harassment and unnecessary
litigation expenses. Any solution must confront this problem.
A. Reply by Counteraction
The counteraction tactic is not exclusively reserved for defendants. Environmental plaintiffs confronted with harassing counteractions could respond with counteractions of their own based on malicious prosecution or abuse of process theories and, where appropriate, on alleged deprivations of state and federal constitutional rights.
This tactic is of little aid, however, to poorly financed environmentalists, inexperienced in litigation.
The limitations on the use of plaintiffs' counteractions are illustrated in Three Lakes Association v. Whiting. 109 In 1970, Three
Lakes Association and its individual members brought suit requesting injunctive relief against a group of land developers who were
seeking to construct a large condominium project on Torch Lake in
northern Michigan. 110 Although the court refused to enjoin construction, it retained jurisdiction in case of subsequent environmental
problems. 111 In 1971, seeking to prevent future opposition to construction, the land developers instituted a countersuit112 against the
original environmental plaintiffs that requested $2.5 million in damages and alleged, inter alia, interference with prospective economic
advantage and defamation. 113 Several days before serving process
on the environmentalists, the developers allegedly offered to withdraw all of their claims if the environmentalists would agree not to
oppose their plans for an apartment project. 114 The environmental108. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
109. No. 74-025-272 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., Jan. 1975).
110. This underlying suit was Blunt v. Apfel, No. 849 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County,
Mich., Nov. 19, 1970). Even before the filing of the environmentalist counteraction,
Professor Sax had described this confrontation between the environmentalists and the
developers as "a classic knockdown, drag-out affair." Sax & DiMento, supra note
24, at 9 n.33.
111. Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 9.
112. Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973),
was not maintained against all of the original plaintiffs. The Complaint in Three
Lakes Association alleges that one original plaintiff was not named "because of assurances {from the excluded party] that he would cease being a plaintiff in action
849 [Blunt v. Apfel] ••. and cease otherwise to express freely opposition to defendant project." Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 12.
113. Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 12; Sax & DiMento, supra
note 24, at 22.
114. Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 13.
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ists' refusal to assent to this proposal was· followed by nearly four
years of litigation, and culminated in a countersuit by the environmentalists against the developers. The environmentalists' $2.7 million damage request was based on three theories, each grounded in
the developers' alleged misconduct of their countersuit litigation:
abuse of process in bringing the countersuit,115 breach of an agreement to settle the countersuit,116 and violations of state and federal
constitutional rights. 117
As evidenced by Three Lakes Association, a counteraction by
environmentalist plaintiffs does not preclude the assertion of chilling
counteractions by defendants and is at best only a costly confrontation device available after the environmentalist plaintiff has incurred
substantial litigation expenses. Indeed, it may be financially impossible for many environmentalists to assert a counteraction, although
mitigation of this expense factor is possible if environmental groups
can retain lawyers on a contingent fee basis. Moreover, the prospect
of prolonged litigation may be undesirable to an individual or ad hoc
group whose original purpose was to remedy a single environmental danger rather than to become an entrenched spokesman for the
public interest. Finally, widespread use of the "environmentalist
counteraction" would ultimately result in increased court congestion.
A solution that prevents the assertion of harassing counteractions in
the first instance would increase judicial economy.
B.

The Judgment-Proof Corporation

One means of mitigating counteraction harassment by reducing
environmentalist fears is to shield environmental plaintiffs from extensive financial liability by forming judgment-proof corporations.118
Prior to instituting the environmental action, individuals and ad hoc
groups could, with the aid of an attorney, comply with the generally
expedient and inexpensive requirements for corporate formation119
and supply the corporation with only enough assets to cover the costs
115. Id. at 1-30.

116. Id. at 37.
117. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), the complaint alleged that the developers acted under color of state law to deprive the environmentalists of rights "[u]nder
the Constitution of the United States, particularly the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments thereto." Three lAkes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 31. A similar allegation was made regarding rights guaranteed under the Michigan constitution.
Id. at 33. These claims were all rejected by the court.
118. Incorporation for the purpose of avoiding unlimited liability is recognized
in most jurisdictions. The prevailing rule is that where corporate formalities are preserved, initial funding reasonably adequate, and the corporation is not formed for the
purpose of evading an existing obligation, the members enjoy limited liability. H.
HENN, CORPORATIONS § 146, at 250 (2d ed. 1970).
119. Primary requirements include the drafting and filing of articles of incorporation with state and local officials, publication of a notice of incorporation, and the
drafting of corporate bylaws. Id. § 118, at 197.
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of anticipated litigation. Because judgments rendered against the
corporation would be virtually uncollectible, counteractions would be
considerably less effective in creating fear of extensive liability and
thus might not be asserted in the first instance. This proposal is
therefore appealing in that it reduces both court time and litigation
expenses of environmentalists.
Nevertheless, the judgment-proof corporation concept has several troubling aspects. 12° First, a court might lift the corporate veil
and hold individual environmentalists liable for any judgment.
While the criteria courts would employ in deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity are uncertain, 121 courts have disregarded
the corporate entity in other contexts when it was used to defeat public convenience, to justify a wrong, or to insulate a fraud or crime. 122
Arguably, forming a judgment-proof corporation for the sole purpose
of litigating is a type of constructive fraud since the corporate entity
is erected principally to secure the benefits of the judicial forum for
certain individuals without exposing them to the corresponding responsibilities imposed by that forum. A court therefore might impose liability on the corporate shareholders. A second difficulty is
that the judgment-proof corporation provides no protection against
suits brought against the individual members or -shareholders of the
corporation. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of the corporation,
a defendant could harass by asserting a countersuit against one or
more of the individual members of the judgment-proof corporation.
The most significant difficulty with allowing environmentalists to
use judgment-proof corporations to avoid counteraction liability is its
unfairness to counteraction plaintiffs possessing meritorious claims.
Judicial recognition of the corporate entity might unjustly deny compensation on a valid claim for relief and might thereby insulate
wrongdoers from responsibility for their acts. While this undesirable
consequence presumably would inhibit few environmentalists from
attempting to utilize this tactic, it derogates from the attractiveness
120. The claims and relief available to an environmentalist group taking the corporate form may be limited. Although the standing of a corporation to assert the
rights of its members in seeking injunctive relief may be available when at least some
claim of damage to public lands is made, standing to seek damages based on its members' claims of injucy to privately held land may not be. See Delaware Citizens for
Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 (D. Del. 1973 ). B111
see Inglewood Residents' Protective Assn. v. Los Angeles, 6 Env. Rep. Cas. 123S
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974). Since damages are not the primary objective of most environmental litigation, this limitation is not troubling. There remain, however, some instances in which the corporate plaintiff may be at a disadvantage because of the cause
of action upon which it must rely. Cf. Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago,
16 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738, 306 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1973) (federal law preemption precluded suit by municipality for injunction but not its individual citizens' suits based
on theory of inverse condemnation).
121. For most purposes, the corporate entity is separate from its individual members. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59 (1929).
122. See, e.g., Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 41S (1932).
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of the judgment-proof corporation as an equitable solution to the
counteraction problem.
C.

Statutory Bonding Requirement

Adequately funded environmentalists generally can weather
counteraction harassment and, as evidenced by the fact that counteractions are no longer brought against national environmental organizations,123 may often be immune from counteractions in the first instance. This characteristic of the counteraction strategy suggests
that one partial solution to the problem might be to require counteraction plaintiffs to post a security bond for environmentalist litigation expenses incurred in defending the counteraction. Such a provision could resemble those that require security bonding in shareholder derivative actions. 124 The amount of security could be subject to increase if the course of the litigation reveals that it is inadequate or to decrease if it proves excessive. Payment of environmentalist litigation expenses by the counteraction plaintiffs could be required upon a judicial determination that the counteraction was interposed largely for harassment purposes. Judicial economy is promoted to the extent that this proposal discourages the initial assertion
of harassing counteractions. This initial discouragement, coupled
with potential reimbursement of litigation expenses when asserted
counteractions camouflage harassment motives, could assure environmentalists relatively open access to the judicial process. However, the constitutionality and fairness of the proposal are subject to
question.
Any mandatory security requirement is subject to challenge as
an unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law since its
acknowledged effect is to inhibit access to the judicial process by
certain litigants.125 In general, the validity of a security requirement
turns upon its reasonableness in the context within which it is im.~
posed. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 126 the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute requiring shareholders
with relatively small interests in a corporation to post reasonable security for litigation expenses prior to commencing a shareholder derivative suit: "A state may set the terms on which it will permit litigation in its courts . . . . It cannot seriously be said that a state
makes such unre~onable use of its power as to violate the Constitution when it provides liability and security for payment of reasonable
123. See note 18 supra.
124. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. I.Aw § 627 (McKinney 1974). These statutes
provide, inter alia, that shareholders possessing less than a certain percentage or -dollar value of stock must post reasonable security before bringing a derivative action.
12S. See Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. S41, 552. (1948).
126. 337 U.S. S41 (1948).
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expenses if a litigation of this character is adjudged to be unsustainable."127 While acknowledging that security requirements deter litigation, the Court concluded that a state could close its courts when
the requirement of reasonable security was not met.
The application of the Cohen standard to security requirements
for environmental counteractions raises several issues. First, it is arguable that the Cohen result applies only in the specialized context
of shareholder derivative actions. The Court itself noted that a
state's interest in preserving the fiduciary duties owed by shareholders to their corporation constitutes a compelling reason for regulating
derivative actions. 128 Second, the regulation upheld in Cohen imposed security requirements only in the limited circumstances when
a shareholder held less than either 5 per cent or $50,000 worth of
stock. It is thus possible that a broad security requirement covering
all environmental counteractions would not be upheld. 12° Finally,
a court might consider it unfair to require countersuit plaintiffs to
post substantial security when environmentalist plaintiffs are required to post at most a modest bond. 130
D.

Statutory Postponement of Counteractions

A final possible solution to the counteraction problem is to postpone counteractions by statute until termination of the environmental
claim. Such a statute would have to preserve explicitly the right to
bring counteractions at that time and would have to toll the statute
of limitations on the environmentalists' activities while the environmental claim is being litigated. This proposal presumably would reduce the harassment and fear of liability engendered by counteractions and reduce the incidence of frivolous counteractions.
While no existing environmental legislation contains such a limitation, an analogous framework exists under summary repossession
statutes currently in force in many states. 131 The hearing on a re121. 337 U.S. at 549.
128. 337 U.S. at 552.
129. Courts considering the applicability of bonding requirements have given
them a rather limited reading. In refusing to make a plaintiff who had satisfied the
5 per cent or $50,000 requirement pay a defendant's litigation expenses when the de•
fondant prevailed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that security for expense
legislation "was not intended to discourage derivative actions generally ••• but only
to prevent 'abuses attending the maintenance of such actions by persons whose finnn•
cial stake in the corporation is slight.'" Shapiro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 281,
210 A.2d 890, 892 (1965).
130. See Florida Environmental Protection Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 14B, §
403.412(f) (1975) (providing that the prevailing party is entitled costs and attorneys'
fees and authorizing the court to order a plaintiff of doubtful solvency to post "a
good and sufficient surety bond or cash"); Michigan Environmental Protection Act,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1202a (Supp. 1974) (imposing a maximum of $500).
131. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 57, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MICH. COMP,
LAws ANN.§§ 600.5714-.5732 (Supp. 1975).
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quest for summary repossession is generally limited to determining
who is entitled to the property and defendants are proscribed from
introducing extraneous issues: "The defendant may under a general
denial of the allegations of the complaint give in evidence any matter in defense of the action. No matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder,
counterclaim or otherwise."132 Such statutes apply only to defendants and generally do not prohibit defendants from bringing countersuits against the plaintiffs before the plaintiffs' claims are finally
adjudicated. To postpone counteractions in the environmental context, the statute would need to apply to third parties as well as to
defendants and should prohibit countersuits in addition to counterclaims.
Constitutional issues are raised, however, by any provision limiting an individual's access to the judicial process. It is well settled
that the due process clause prohibits a state from eliminating essential issues from the original hearing of a case.133 Since the proposed
provision preserves a defendant's opportunity to present any valid
defense, this prohibition presumably is not violated. Due process
also requires, however, that issues be heard in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time. 134 The proposed provision as applied
could at times run afoul of this constitutional mandate. While summary repossession proceedings are rapid, discovery and pre-trial procedures in environmental litigation may easily last months or even
years. 135 Effective denial of the right to be heard at a meaningful
time thus might result from delaying a defendant's right to bring a
countersuit against an environmentalist. Between initiation and settlement of the environmental claim, conditions could change, witnesses could disappear, and possible evidence could become stale
or unavailable. Courts are not likely to uphold such legislation when
its practical effect in a given situation is to foreclose a defendant's
opportunity to assert his claims.
This proposal is desirable, however, in that it should decrease
the incidence of frivolous counteractions and increase the percentage
of environmental claims fairly settled. Necessarily, a statute requiring postponement of counteractions pending litigation of an environ132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57, § 5 (Supp. 1975).
133. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
134. The Supreme Court appears to be willing to uphold limiting statutes so long
as such statutes provide for a full hearing on all claims by the litigants at a meaningful time subsequent to the original proceeding. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972).
135. For those cases litigated under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act
before 1974, the mean length of completed cases was ten months, the median seven
months, and the range, from one to thirty-four months. Sax & DiMento, supra note
24, at 8.
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mental claim forces separate treatment of issues springing from the
same transaction and concerning the same parties. Judicial inefficiency, however, should not result since defendants presumably
would bring counteractions only in the instances when their claims
were meritorious or when they anticipated that the same environmentalists would institute claims against them in the future.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As more environmentalists seek judicial aid in remedying environmental harm, use of the counteraction tactic is likely to increase.
Unfortunately, there exists no easy solution to this problem. Any legislative solution, moreover, is apt to encounter significant opposition
from those expecting to be defendants in, or to be affected by, environmental suits. Perhaps the most efficient solution, which is outside the realm of legislation and planning, is for the environmental
plaintiffs to realize that harassing counteractions do not realistically
threaten extensive financial liability. As was suggested by an attorney who has had extensive experience handling counteraction
threats: "There is no real answer to the problems posed by defendants whose defense consists of threats and intimidations excepting
a tough plaintiff and a tough plaintiff's attorney." 136
136. Wilcox Letter, supra note 21.

